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Introduction
This paper studies the e¤ect of a minimum quality standard, a compulsory labeling scheme, and the combination of both instruments in a vertical di¤erentiation model when not all quality dimensions of products can be observed by consumers.
In the European Union, product quality is not only driven by consumer preferences, but also by political preferences. Two instruments are commonly applied to increase Department of Economics, University of Göttingen, Platz der Göttinger Sieben 3, 37073 Göttingen, Germany, laura.birg@wiwi.uni-goettingen.de.
Department of Economics, NGU Nürtingen-Geislingen University, Neckarsteige 6-10, 72622 Nürtingen, Germany, jan.vosswinkel@hfwu.de. 1 product quality: Compulsory labeling schemes and minimum quality standards. Compulsory labeling is usually deemed as "soft" instrument that does not change the product design directly, whereas minimum quality standards are considered "hard" instruments, because they force …rms directly to change their products according to political preferences. One prominent example for market interventions is the reduction of energy consumption and of negative environmental impacts of energy using and energy related products.
Energy-related quality aspects are di¢cult to monitor for consumers, especially when products are not energy consuming, but "energy-related" like shower heads or thermal insulation products for buildings. At the same time, labeling schemes become more and more complex. For example, the energy labeling scheme for vacuum cleaners 1 contains up to …ve quality dimensions plus the well-known overall rating ranging between D and A +++ . This multidimensional labeling scheme indicates that consumers need additional information on several quality dimensions for their purchase decision. On the other hand, labeling alone sometimes seems not to be su¢cient to make labeled quality dimensions relevant for purchase decisions. Prior to the light bulb ban in the European Union consumers did not care much about the labeled energy e¢ciency classes. So because "soft" labeling alone did not result in the politically desired reaction of consumers, it was complemented by a "hard" minimum quality standard.
In order to improve the energy and environmental performance of products both labeling schemes (Energy Labeling Directive 2010/30/EU) and minimum quality standards (Ecodesign Directive 2009/125/EC) are used. An ever growing list of products falls under the Energy Labeling Directive and/or the Ecodesign Directive in the European Union. The "Working Plan 2012-2014 under the Ecodesign Directive" 2 lists 57 groups of products for which an energy labeling scheme and/or a minimum energy e¢ciency standard already applies or is foreseen for the near future. Products in the Working Plan are e.g. fans, light bulbs, vacuum cleaners, dishwashers, televisions, shower heads, power cables and thermal insulation products for buildings.
Both directives address the same products in principle. This may cause problems compared to the single use of only one instrument, because overlapping instruments may impede each other. This paper shows that and how the combined use of a labeling scheme and a minimum quality standard a¤ects overall product quality, competition, and welfare. While the single use of a minimum quality standard or a labeling scheme do not a¤ect market shares, their combined use does. The single use of a minimum 2 quality standard or a labeling scheme do not a¤ect the unregulated quality dimension, but their combined use does, depending on the level of the minimum standard. While there are potential welfare gains of applying one instrument only, welfare e¤ects of their combined use are ambiguous. The combined e¤ect of both instruments is more than simply the sum of its parts.
We assume products with two quality dimensions. The …rst dimension is observable and relevant for consumers, while the other is relevant, but not observable. For example, consumers can monitor the energy e¢ciency of electrical household appliances only at considerable cost. Alternatively, it may be assumed that the second dimension is observable to consumers, but not relevant unless the government imposes a compulsory labeling scheme (as suggested by Schmeiser, 2014) . The second dimension of the product quality may relate to energy intensity or harmful emissions. Because consumers do not observe and are not willing to pay for this quality dimension, there are no incentives for …rms to invest in quality improvements concerning the hidden dimension and they provide the lowest possible quality level. We assume that the government can costlessly observe the quality level and apply minimum quality standards or compulsory labeling schemes (see Bonroy & Constantatos, 2014 for a survey on the economic impact of labeling schemes).
We assume that a labeling scheme makes the hidden quality dimension observable but does not a¤ect market power of …rms (see Baltzer, 2012 for an analysis of the e¤ects on market power).
This paper relates to the literature on minimum quality standards in several ways.
The literature on minimum quality standards has stressed that quality choices of oligopolistic …rms di¤er from socially optimal levels (Scarpa, 1998) . If …rms' choices of quality levels are suboptimal, the introduction of a minimum quality standard may be welfareimproving. Like Ronnen (1991) and Crampes & Hollander (1995) we consider duopolistic markets, where single product …rms face minimum quality standards as exogenous constraints. We assume that the provision of quality improvements entails no …xed cost for …rms, but rather variable costs, similar to Motta (1993) and Crampes & Hollander (1995) . Fixed cost of quality improvements stem from quantity independent features like the design of the product or R&D investments. Variable costs of quality improvements are related to higher quality materials or more complex production processes. For the lists of products mentioned above, like electrical household appliances or insulation products, variable cost of quality improvements seem to be more relevant, as an enhanced quality level requires more complex production processes or higher quality materials.
Against this background, we study the e¤ect of a minimum quality standard, a labeling scheme, and the combination of both instruments on prices and quality levels in a vertical di¤erentiation model following Ecchia & Lambertini (1997) . It assumes a duopolistic market structure with one …rm selling a high-quality product and the other selling a low-quality product. We endogenize the quality levels of both quality dimensions and assume variable cost of quality improvements. Consumers are heterogeneous with respect to their preference for quality. Both a minimum quality standard on the non-observable quality dimension and a labeling scheme that informs consumers about the non-observable quality dimension have no impact on the observable quality dimension, increase prices, and have no impact on demand, given that only one of the two instruments is applied. The combination of a minimum standard and a labeling scheme results in considerably di¤erent results. It reduces (enhances) investment in the observable quality dimension, if the standard is su¢ciently low (high). It increases prices and shifts demand from the low-quality …rm to the high-quality …rm (from the high-quality …rm to the low-quality …rm), if the standard is su¢ciently low (high). A labeling scheme without a minimum quality standard is welfare increasing, if the market su¢ciently small. A minimum quality standard may decrease or increase welfare depending on the level of the standard. Welfare may increase or decrease in the combined scheme compared to the use of a minimum quality standard only.
These results suggest that combining two instruments for only one policy goal may result in complex interactions, ambiguous welfare implications and unintended e¤ects on competition. So the European Commission should consider the combined use carefully in order to avoid welfare losses and distorted competition. In some cases, the application of one instrument only may be preferable compared to a combined use.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the vertical di¤erentiation model is presented. Section 3 studies the case of no government intervention, the e¤ects of a minimum quality standard, a compulsory labeling scheme, and the combination of both. Section 4 analyzes welfare, section 5 concludes. The production technology is characterized by variable cost, which is convex in quality and linear in quantity. For the list of products mentioned above, this may be a reasonable assumption, as quality improvements require higher quality materials or more complex production processes. Firms incur …xed cost f for developing a product and entering the market. For simplicity we assume identical variable costs for s and v. The cost function is given as
The Model
Consumers di¤er in their preference for quality in both dimensions , which is uni- 1997) . Each consumer buys at most one unit of the most preferred good. We assume that s and v are perfect substitutes for consumers, if v is observable. The utility derived from no purchase is zero, while a consumer who buys one unit of the good at price p obtains a net utility of
A consumer with a positive net utility of the good chooses the most preferred version of the good by trading o¤ (observed) quality against the price. A higher implies a higher willingness to pay for quality. It can be considered the marginal rate of substitution between income and quality (Tirole, 1988) . The consumer heterogeneity can be interpreted as di¤erences in income, in taste, or in frequency of usage.
The marginal consumer indi¤erent between purchasing the high-quality good and the low-quality good is given by =
Disregarding the unobservable quality dimension v this simpli…es to = p H p L s H s L . Hence, demand for the good of quality H and the good of quality L respectively is given by
Firms' pro…ts are given by
Competition follows a three-stage game: In the …rst stage, the government decides whether to apply a minimum quality standard, a labeling scheme, or both instruments Both quality levels increase in the maximum willingness to pay b and decrease in the marginal cost of quality improvement t.
Firms set equilibrium prices p H and p L (see Appendix). Both prices increase in the maximum willingness to pay b and decrease in the marginal cost of quality improvement t.
The duopoly is symmetric, quantities are q H = q L = 1 2 . Firms' pro…ts are identical. Proposition 1 Suppose a minimum quality standard on quality dimension v is introduced that is binding for both …rms. Then the standard i) has no impact on quality dimension s, ii) increases both prices, and iii) has no impact on demand.
Minimum Quality Standard on v

Labeling
Now assume that the government imposes a labeling scheme concerning v that informs consumers about the level of this quality dimension instead of a minimum quality standard. This used to be the case for many household appliances and light bulbs. As v is now visible to consumers, they take v into account in making their purchase decision - Proposition 2 Suppose a labeling scheme that informs consumers about quality dimension v is introduced. Then the labeling scheme i) has no impact on quality dimension s, ii) increases both prices, and iii) has no impact on demand. 
Combined Scheme -Minimum Standard and Labeling
Welfare
Consider social cost that may be reduced by an enhanced quality level of products.
This social cost may be caused a negative externality such as harmful emissions of power generation stemming from a low level of v. The regulator aims to maximize welfare that is given as the sum of pro…ts, consumer surplus, and the cost of the externality R. The cost of the externality is given as
. Without any regulation with respect to v both …rms set their quality level to v H = v L = 0, so R = .
Minimum Quality Standard on v
If the government introduces a minimum quality standard on v, but no compulsory
Depending on V and t social welfare may decrease or increase under the minimum quality standard (see Appendix). Welfare may decrease (increase), if the minimum quality standard is su¢ciently high (small) for a given level of t. So regulators have to take the costs of quality improvement carefully into account when setting the minimum quality standard V .
Labeling
Compared to no regulation, social welfare may decrease or increase under the labeling scheme depending on market size b (see Appendix). If markets are su¢ciently small, a compulsory labeling scheme has a positive e¤ect on social welfare. This implies that providing additional information to consumers concerning an unobservable quality dimension is only welfare increasing, if consumers do not care about this dimension too much.
Combined Scheme -Minimum Standard and Labeling
Consider now a combined scheme of a minimum quality standard and labeling as introduced in section 3.4.
Social welfare is higher (lower) under the combined scheme than under the minimum quality standard only, if the market size b is small and V is su¢ciently low (high). Social welfare is higher (lower) under the combined scheme than under the minimum quality standard only, if the market size b is su¢ciently large and V is su¢ciently high (low).
Social welfare is higher (lower) under the combined scheme than under labeling only, if the market size b is small and V is su¢ciently low (high). If the market size b is su¢ciently large, social welfare is lower under the combined scheme than under labeling only.
These results imply that it is di¢cult for policy makers to calibrate their instruments, if more than one instrument is applied for each policy objective. There are potential welfare gains by the combination of both instruments, but welfare losses are also possible depending on the market size and the level of the minimum quality standard. 
Conclusion
This paper has studied the e¤ect of a minimum quality standard, a compulsory labeling scheme, and the combination of both instruments in a vertical di¤erentiation model when not all quality dimensions of products are observable to consumers. We have assumed variable cost of quality improvement. This may be an appropriate assumption for many products that are regulated by the Ecodesign Directive and the Labeling Directive of the EU.
Both a minimum quality standard and a labeling scheme have no impact on the visible quality dimension s, increase both prices, and have no impact on market shares.
The combination of a minimum standard and a labeling scheme a¤ects investment in quality dimension s, depending on V , increases prices, shifts demand from the L-…rm to the H-…rm (from the H-…rm to the L-…rm), if V is su¢ciently low (high).
For a given level of cost of quality improvement, a su¢ciently low level of the minimum quality standard increases welfare compared to the case of no regulation, while a high level of the minimum quality standard decreases welfare. So the European Commission should calibrate the minimum quality standards based on the Ecodesign Directive carefully, taking variable costs of quality improvements into account.
A labeling scheme without a minimum quality standard is welfare increasing com-10 pared to the case of no regulation, if the market is su¢ciently small. It is an open question, whether the willingness to pay for quality in single market of the European Union is su¢ciently "small" to reach welfare improvements due to energy labeling. If the willingness to pay di¤ers between member states, there may be welfare gains in some member states, but welfare losses in other.
The combination of both instruments leads to no clear results with respect to welfare.
There are potential welfare gains by the combination of both instruments, but welfare losses are also possible. In addition, while the use of one of both instruments only does not a¤ect competition, it is the combination of both instruments that alters market shares.
While labeling is deemed as a "soft" instrument, it has a strong in ‡uence on quality levels. If it is combined with a minimum quality level it even alters market shares while they remain una¤ected by the single use of a "hard" minimum quality standard.
The results of this paper are based on a special assumption concerning the production technology: Firms are able to set the quality levels of both dimensions s and v independently. In many cases alternative production technologies may be more realistic,
where quality levels of both dimensions are interdependent, e.g. an increase in v may be associated with a decrease of s or an increase of the cost of s. In this case, an increase of V may lead to a decrease of the visible quality dimension s. The transition from the traditional light bulb to energy saving lamps may be an example: While the energy e¢ciency increased tremendously, the light quality decreased in the perspective of many
consumers. An analysis of the e¤ects of alternative production technologies seems to be a promising topic for future research.
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A Appendix
A.1 No regulation
Equilibrium quality levels
@s H @b > 0; @s L @b > 0 @s H @t < 0; @s L @t < 0
First stage equilibrium prices
Both prices increase in the willingness to pay b ( @p H @b > 0, @p L @b > 0) and decrease in the marginal cost of quality improvement t ( @p H @t < 0, @p L @t < 0). Quantities are q H = q L = 1 2 .
Firms' pro…ts are 
